Posts Tagged industry

Franchisor Liability As a Joint-Employer

Franchisors have a valid interest in protecting the brand they have worked hard to create. they accomplish this by requiring uniformity from their franchisees and exercising control over certain aspects of their franchisees’ operations. This includes control over the location and look of their franchisees’ places of business, the products and services offered by their franchisees and how intellectual property is utilized and protected by their franchisees. Franchisors also exercise control over their franchisees’ “employees by dictating minimum employment standards, the type of training that is required for employees and the clothing or uniforms employees must wear. Unfortunately, this control over their franchisees’ employees can sometimes create liability for franchisors when employees sue the franchisees for violations of Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act or other labor laws. It is becoming increasingly common that employees are also suing the franchisor claiming the franchisor is liable because they acted as a joint-employer based upon the amount of control they exercised over their franchisees’ employees. This joint-employer claim creates a second, deep pocket for them to pursue. Background of Joint-Employer Liability The current standard for determining whether an individual or entity is a joint-employer was set forth in the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”)’s 2015 decision in the Browning-Ferris Industries matter. Specifically, the NLRB held the primary inquiry for determining joint-employer status is whether the purported joint-employer possesses the actual or potential authority to exercise control over the primary employer’s employees, regardless of whether the control is in fact ever exercised. In December 2017, the NLRB established a more employer-friendly standard in the Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd. matter that required the purported joint-employer to actually exercise joint control over essential employment terms, rather than just reserving the right to exercise such control. This control had to be “direct and immediate”